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Abstract 
Analysing individual acts committed by financial criminals requires not only addressing the 
collective perception of individual responsibility but also the need for shared responsibility in the 
fight against financial crime.  Given that financial crime impacts both on the functioning and 
financing of society, this paper highlights the need to explore the far-reaching implications of 
every criminal act. Engaging the necessary resources to effectively and collectively combat this 
scourge cannot be achieved if analysis is restricted to the nature of criminal acts and motives of the 
perpetrators. 
 
Introduction 
The social, economic or environmental responsibility of agents, according to the circumstances of 
their establishment, is firstly determined by making a clear legal distinction between criminal offences 
that harm others or society itself, and civil offences. The responsibility of physical and moral persons 
should be dealt with judicially before attempting a more sociological approach. The legal terms 
describing the nature of acts committed in a given place relate to the concepts of civil, penal and 
professional responsibility. Therefore, if the victim of a tort is entitled to civil compensation for 
damage caused by a third party, then the perpetrator should also face a fine or a custodial sentence, 
proportional to the harm caused to society. In the case of non-compliance with professional guidelines 
or ethics, standard-setting authorities can be empowered to impose sanctions ranging from temporary 
suspension to a lifelong ban. The civil basis of this approach emphasizes the need to understand and 
perceive the exact nature of the harm caused, determined by a fair trial, under criminal law if 
warranted. The penal definition of the term financial crime covers corporate offences, fiscal fraud and 
money laundering but also related crimes such as pimping, kidnapping and murder, requiring the 
intervention of law enforcement agencies. The opening statement should be balanced by the need to 
understand, interpret and put into perspective the reasons which lead economic agents to become 
criminals. What drives individuals to decide on their own volition to compromise their company’s 
development by extorting funds, an act leading ultimately to a new form of utilitarian exploitation of 
rare and precious resources and public assets? Given that an isolated offender has a limited capacity to 
cause harm, the fight against financial crime should attempt to uncover any form of collusion, 
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including that of state or transnational players. It is essential to question the nature of individual acts 
committed by financial criminals and their public perception (I) with the consequent necessity of 
focusing not only on individual responsibility for these acts (II) but also shared responsibility in the 
fight against financial crime (III). 
 
I- Individual acts and shared perception of financial criminals 
Durkheim (1893) claimed that punishment is above all designed to act upon upright people, not on 
criminals and we do not reprove an act because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we reprove it. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of sanctions against financial crimes cannot be gauged without assessing 
the level of responsibility felt by the perpetrators. This standpoint calls for a multi-faceted approach to 
understanding, evaluating and punishing financial crimes whilst raising two key questions: when a 
financial crime is committed, should the perpetrator be held solely accountable or does the social 
perception of financial crime also need to be challenged? Can the perpetrator be dissociated from 
his/her social context?  
Both questions suggest an uncertain relationship between means and ends. Morin maintains that 
both the deontological aspect (belief in rules) and teleological aspect (belief in purpose) are morally 
lacking as the former favours the means and the latter is means-dependent. (2006: 49) This dichotomy 
makes clear that financial criminals have a distinct morality. Since an inherent desire for a guaranteed 
income or excessive profits takes precedence over compliance with ethical guidelines, financial 
criminals see no need for soul-searching during a fraud investigation, for instance, basing their defence 
on good faith and claims of persecution  
 
The uncertainty principle of ends and means. Since ends and means inter-retro act on each 
other, base means put to noble ends almost inevitably pervert them and finally replace 
them. (Morin, 1999: 46)   
 
Profit-seeking, key to corporate growth in a capitalist system, is not inherently amoral but the 
underlying conditions may well be. Thus, all depends not only on the chosen reference model but also 
on how it works. Financial crime is the continuum between a given economic situation and the means 
used to achieve individual wealth. Capitalism, whether  financial as in the Anglo-American tradition, 
religious as in Saudi Arabia and Qatar or state-run as in China, generates similar behaviour, in which 
belief in purpose, namely profit, takes precedence over belief in moral law, namely, the development 
of the common good.  When a system favours ends over means, solidarity is seen as secondary to 
efficiency in the exploitation of rare and precious resources, leading to a potential perception of 
financial crime as a pecuniary counterpart of physical exchange. Morin asks if there can ever be an 
improvement in human relations and in the links that bind the individual to society. (2006: 49)   
His reply does not inspire optimism 
 
It should first be noted that the historic failure of every attempt to improve humankind, 
whether by moral and religious preachers or by eliminating dominators and exploiters, is 
often replaced by something worse. There have only been ephemeral moments of concord 
and harmony during liberations or emerging revolutions which are quickly reabsorbed and 
dissipated.  (2006: 49)   
 
Morin’s teachings show the sterility of moral, supernatural discourse when not backed by a superior 
value such as the rule of law with a concomitant desire to develop a just society that imposes deterrent 
punishments which strip perpetrators of their liberty and rights. By combining the hypothetical 
imperative, or legality, with the categorical imperative, or morality, Kant shows access to liberty is 
only possible if these two imperatives are met. This thesis forms the basis of a secular society in which 
law is a guarantor of a successful transition from a state of nature to a social order. Financial crime 
should be seen as inevitable when a state of nature is abandoned to an unbridled free market. In a 
rationale of market efficiency, whenever methodological individualism asserts the primacy of ‘I’ over 
the collective ‘we’, then a distortion of rules seems logical. In order to ensure wealth creation, 
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financial crime fighters should thus balance protection for the community, through taxation for 
instance, and standardised individual development. 
Elias also evokes 
 
The curious party game that certain groups in western society are apt to indulge in over and 
over again. There are two opposed parties: one says, ‘Everything depends on the individual, 
the other, ‘Everything depends on society’. The first group says: ‘But it is always particular 
individuals who decide to do this and not that.’ The others reply: ‘But their decisions are 
socially conditioned.’ The first group says: ‘But what you call “social conditioning” only 
comes about because others want to do something and do it. (1991: 61-62)  
 
He then goes on to explain that 
 
The whole debate tacitly assumes – as a point of secret collusion, the undiscussed basis of 
the discussion – that the ‘social’ is what is ‘the same’ or ‘typical’ among a number of 
people, while what makes a person unique and different from all others – in short, a more or 
less pronounced individuality – is an extra-social element that is forthwith assigned, for 
rather obscure reasons, either a biological or a metaphysical origin according to taste. At 
this point thought and observation come to an end.  (1991: 61-62)   
 
 The power of law, essential in the fight against crime, offences and misdemeanours, takes account of 
the specificity of the individual in a given society. The inherent question posed by Elias hinges 
therefore on the choice and implementation procedures of social norms to ensure that they are 
recognised and agreed as being fair and equitable. Financial crime or deviance merely amplify the 
basis of a utilitarian system, in which Manne defended the concept of insider trading, maintaining that 
as insiders pay a high price for information, it would be unjust to prevent them from using it. Hence, 
perfectly equal access to financial information would be counter-productive because operators would 
no longer be able to make their expected profits and improve on average market performance (1966: 
113).   
This position raises questions about the role of financial markets. Are they places where personal 
enrichment is achieved through high-risk speculative operations or places where mid-term and long-
term development projects are financed? The adoption of social norms based on improving general 
well-being entails that financial information should be considered a public good and any distortion of 
such data by insider dealers must be categorised as an infringement or offence.  
Measuring the accountability of perpetrators is a key challenge in adapting the scale of repressive 
sanctions for financial crimes. Ricœur strove to give a precise meaning to the word ‘responsibility’ 
and responding to Aeschlimann, he stated that 
  
The word: ‘responsibility’, also suffers from ambiguity. In the weak sense, the word is used 
thus: a person who is the author of his/her acts is described as responsible. Personally, I 
think it would be better in this case to use the term ‘imputability’: an action is considered 
‘imputable’ to a person. In its strong sense, which is also its true sense, the notion of 
‘responsibility’ is developed by Jonas.  (…). The author shows that true responsibility is 
exercised towards something or someone fragile, entrusted to us (…) The notion of 
accountability is absolutely key here. We also find the play between personal structure and 
otherness because I am always responsible for another who might eventually hold me to 
account. (1994: 24-25)  
 
This approach to responsibility, in which financial criminals are punished in proportion to the impact 
of their crimes on society, is crucial to its very survival. The level of liability incurred by a given 
individual determines whether his/her positioning is fair or unfair. Aristotle maintained that ‘Firstly, 
he who breaks the laws is considered unjust and secondly, he who takes more than his share, or the 
unfair man.’ (1898: 138) When insider traders are seen as economic agents engaging in unjust 
schemes, this underscores the need for their liability to be incurred well beyond the act committed. 
Indeed, the offence goes beyond the damaged suffered by their co-shareholders in that it seriously 
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undermines the economic concept of trust in financial information. The insider trader erodes the 
essential respect for the other which company owners must uphold for their businesses to prosper. As 
in the case of of misuse of corporate assets, the perpetrator weakens the structure he/she is charged 
with protecting. The notion of responsibility, as developed by Ricœur, assumes its full dimension, 
when a sanction is imposed against an offender whose behaviour is unjust. It is thus important to 
return to the genesis of the criminal act.  
Bourdieu points out that 
Sociology thus postulates that there is a reason in what agents do (in the sense that one 
speaks of a reason of a series) which must be found; this reason permits one to explain and 
to transform a series of apparently incoherent, arbitrary behaviours into a coherent series, 
into something that can be understood according to a unique principle or a coherent set of 
principles. In this sense, sociology postulates that social agents do not engage in gratuitous 
acts. (1998: 76)  
  
A motivational analysis of financial criminals would enable investigators to track the development of 
their intellectual approach while a rationality analysis of the criminal act in the financial arena would 
ensure that legal players or sociological agents are not isolated from their social context. 
R. Le Loire, investigative judge and senior member of the Finance Division of the Tribunal de 
Grande Instance de Paris, made the following remark when asked about the standard criteria, common 
motives and identical motivations of major financial criminals  
 
Everything’s confused in their minds. The lure of financial gain makes them feel they exist 
and stand out from the crowd. Indeed, some big criminals make a profession out of it. Take 
VAT carousel fraud for instance. People do it because they can make a very good living 
from it. They drive around in expensive cars and have beautiful wives. Their lifestyle is far 
removed from the humdrum lives of ordinary people. 
 
This analysis helps clarify the notion developed by Bourdieu that ‘political morality does not fall from 
heaven’. (1998: 144)  But how can one develop a sense of morality, how can agents be convinced not 
to slip into crime?   
 
(…) the cult of public service and of devotion to the common good, cannot resist the 
critique of suspicion that will endlessly uncover corruption, clientelism, ambitiousness, and 
at best a private interest in serving a public purpose. By a “legitimate imposture”, in 
Austin’s words, public persons are private persons socially legitimated and encouraged to 
think of themselves as public persons, thus to think of themselves and to present themselves 
as servants devoted to the common good . (Bourdieu, 1998: 144)    
 
II- Individual responsibility for acts committed 
Highlighting the criminal liability of perpetrators can only be realised in an Aristotelian framework in 
which ‘the laws prescribe about all manner of things, aiming at the common interest of all (…) by 
reference to personal excellence, or to some other such standard.’ (Aristotle, 1898: 139) The 
perception of a crime or offence depends on the scale of values embraced by a free and organised 
society. Thus, if Aristotle is right in claiming that ‘justice, then, in this sense of the word, is complete 
virtue, with the addition that it is displayed towards others’ (1898: 138)  then it follows that a scale of 
sanctions should be applied according to how much damage is inflicted on society. White-collar 
financial crime is based on a particularity which is both visible, due to the absence of crimes of blood, 
and invisible, due to the misuse of a vital resource such as financial information. The criminal 
misappropriation of information reaches a paroxysm in the privatisation of a vital public good such as 
knowledge. Indeed, financial information, manipulated and exploited for private purposes, deprives its 
users of transparent access to an essential resource and thus prevents them from acting in full 
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knowledge of the facts. Those, such as tax evaders, who exploit the fault lines of a system, harm not 
only public finances but also undermine the trust economy. No long-term development project can be 
realised as long as public finances are siphoned off by economic predators.  Hence, it would be 
pointless to separate the individual from an act committed in a company, as such positioning would 
only result in vain excuses by perpetrators, wishing to exculpate themselves.  
If, like Elias one considers that 
 
Society with its regularity is nothing outside individuals; nor is it simply and ‘object’ 
‘opposite’ the individual; it is what every individual means when he says ‘we’. But this 
‘we’ does not come into being because a large number of individual people who say ‘I’ to 
themselves subsequently come together and decide to form an association. The 
interpersonal functions and relations that we express by grammatical particles such as ‘I’, 
‘you’, ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘we’ and ‘they’ are interdependent. None of them has an existence 
without the others. (1991: 61)  
 
Unity of thought and action among individuals in a company requires shared responsibility for any 
deviant behaviour and this can only be achieved when individual deviant behaviour is no longer 
allowed to undermine the ability of a company to function 
  
There are different ways to approach the issue of responsibility. One way is through 
imputation: recognising ones acts, being capable of taking more or less complete 
responsibility for them (…) The notion of responsibility as a response concerns not only the 
capacity to be accountable but also refers to the publicity dimension, in the sense of making 
public what one has done: the capacity to respond publicly, an integral component of 
democracy. The other key dimension of democracy is to include those who are potentially 
involved in the decision-making process. I do not know to what extent this is possible in the 
area of financial innovation for instance. (Monod et al., 2011: 28, 41) 
 
 This requires a company to use fair and implementable coercive provisions against perpetrators of 
financial crimes 
   
The repression of acts committed by individuals is the primary vector for criminal policy. 
We assume that an individual set on engaging in such activity will justify his/her attitude 
based on the expected gains, probability of being arrested, the fine and/or prison sentence 
likely to be imposed and the negative value attributed to the time spent in prison. This 
hypothesis does not assume that such agents actually make such an economic calculation 
but it is the best possible simplification, particularly in the area of economic crime. (Kopp, 
2001: 3)  
 
Based on this assertion, a repressive penal policy may prove effective in cases where the perpetrators’ 
intellectual approach is driven only by financial gain and the exploitation of legal and regulatory 
loopholes. Any punishment imposed must fit the crime, assuming that the perpetrator acted of his/her 
own free will.  
Létourneau and Naccarato claim that 
 
Deviant behaviour and the failure of financial service providers to meet contractual 
obligations lead to a breach in the relationship of trust between parties. More importantly, 
legislators, courts and perpetrators recognise, from a relatively harsh discourse, the severity 
of crimes committed in this area, not only the harmful consequences suffered by the victims 
but also the erosion of trust towards financial markets and players and even the legal system 
which is partially responsible for controlling such deviance. (2010: 14) 
 
From an economic analysis standpoint, the cost-effectiveness of sanctions is justified as a means of 
dissuading potential criminals and maintaining an optimal level of crime 
   
International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 2013, 171-180 
176 
 
 The public decision-maker can work with two variables: the severity of the sanction and 
the probability of arrest, recommending an increase in the probable fine that will result in 
benefits outweighing the costs of repression. This process is interrupted when the last crime 
avoided costs more to avoid that the net damage it would have caused. The process is 
interrupted when the cost of preventing a crime is greater than the net damage it would 
have caused.3 (Kopp, 2001: 3)  
 
An economic analysis of the true cost of financial crime should include a socio-legal approach of the 
personalities of perpetrators. As members of the company in which they operate, they seek to stand out 
from other social groups by seeking to make as much money as possible in the shortest possible time. 
Economically removing the agent from his/her reference group results in a form of rhetoric, 
unceasingly denounced by Lebaron 
  
The rhetoric of ‘neutrality’ has become key to building legitimacy into institutions and 
economic policies.  However, it is not imposed in absolute terms, to the point of eliminating 
all challenges: more than ever, the economic order is about symbolic struggles. The balance 
of powers between social groups thus corresponds to a dominant form of economic beliefs 
which help define the basis of the economic order and this is why times of crisis are useful 
for highlighting more clearly how easily these beliefs are accepted as self-evident truths.  
(2000: 215)  
 
The attribution of responsibility for financial crimes can only be legitimate if perpetrators admit that 
they cannot claim to be unwitting players in the financial capitalist system and deny that they acted of 
their own free will. Imposing individual sanctions to fit the crime or offence should thus be the first 
step in challenging the deviant behaviour of a system based on individual utilitarianism. The fight 
against crime should thus balance recognition of the free will of agents engaged in the economic 
circuit against the power of the law to adapt individual behaviour to norms for the common good. 
Ignoring the decisional capacity of economic agents and only focusing on the societal causes of their 
deviant behaviour merely serves to weaken the very essence of the rule of law. In other words, it is 
vital to challenge criminal players without minimising their impact under the pretext of the moral 
bankruptcy of the capitalist system. An individual or collective tort or criminal act implies a 
proportional sanction, imposed on the physical or moral persons concerned. Harmonious relations, in a 
given society need to be supported by a legal framework guaranteed by national sovereignty. This 
implies that any action that interferes with national sovereignty, such as fraudulent tax evasion, will be 
seen as anti-democratic and result in individual tax offenders facing the full weight of the law. The 
main issue, and one not easily resolved, involves clearly identifying the authors of financial crimes 
 
In the course of their function, white-collar criminals of economic or financial political 
elites commit crimes which are less visible by their very nature (corruption, insider trading, 
fraud etc.) than those generally committed by blue-collar criminals (armed robbery, 
racketeering, etc.) particularly as these economic and financial crimes can easily take the 
form of legal transactions and thus remain hidden. This is why the perfect crime is far more 
prevalent on the Mount Olympus of ‘white-collar’ crime than it is in the streets. Invisibility 
creates a sense of impunity and acts as an incitement to carrying out a crime. (…) 
Particularly as mental and social representations tend to have difficulty associating criminal 
deviance with elites (…) In the case of financial crime, the line between legal and illegal is 
even more blurred than it is for other crimes as the ‘body’ of the crime is largely immaterial 
and thus uncertain. Stigmatising financial behaviour as ‘criminal’ depends as much on its 
                                                          
3 “The argument can be summed up as follows: Net damage caused by the offence = damage suffered by the 
victim – gain for the criminal. The sanction is dissuasive when the gain for the criminal is equal to  the expected 
fine. The optimal sanction is such that the cost of discouraging an additional offence = net social damage = 
damage for the victim – expected fine. 
By rearranging the above expression: Expected fine = damage for the victim – cost of dissuasion of an additional 
crime.” Kopp P., op. cit, p. 6  
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physical and legal reality as on the commitment of public opinion and authorities. 
(Gayraud, 2011: 212) 
 
This reality should be weighed against a scale of values, adhered to by citizens of democratic societies. 
Among these values, consent to taxation remains a characteristic of well-being and harmonious living 
together. A material connection between money laundering and tax fraud is thus hardly surprising 
since tax evasion relies on the existence of offshore financial centres and tax havens to hide 
undeclared income. Responsibility, in the Kantian sense, is subjective; a reasonable person should 
accept the moral consequences of his or her actions since individual responsibility goes hand in hand 
with free will. To deny the role of free will in actions that harm the community is also to deny the 
faculty of discernment. Hence, moral responsibility is inextricably linked to civil or legal 
responsibility and any freely performed action underpinned by positivist internal and supranational 
legal frameworks.  
 
III- Shared responsibility in the fight against financial crime 
 
In the wake of the subprime crisis, imputing the responsibility of institutional actors in the fight 
against financial crime requires objective findings on the nature and evolution of financial capitalism 
 
The 2007-2008 crisis was the product of financial globalisation which failed to ensure the 
harmonious development of the world economy and allowed it to bear the brunt of 
imbalances and instability. It should perhaps be noted that the very products that proved to 
be toxic and which propagated the crisis generated very high profits for those organising 
their issuance and sales over a number of years. (Bachet et al., 2011: 10)  
 
This should be a salutary reminder of the state’s duty to protect the most vulnerable. Jonas reminds us 
that responsibility is an ‘imperative’ which is not inward but outward-looking, towards that which is 
vulnerable. (1992: 135-136) Organising public authority operations so as to ensure a fairer spread of 
the tax burden is the first step in overcoming individualistic profit-seeking as illustrated by 
Condorcet’s Paradox in which rational individual preferences may lead to irrational majority 
preferences. Tax evasion by wealthy individuals who hide their fortunes offshore while making use of 
public services and leaving others to shoulder the tax burden, should be punished as harshly as 
embezzlement and the forced abandonment of public projects due to lack of budgetary resources. This 
raises questions about the nature of the State; is it, in the Marxist sense, a crutch for capitalism? Is it 
turning a blind eye to white-collar criminals by focusing its repressive apparatus on visible racial 
minorities and on more lurid, media-friendly crimes? 
Gayraud raises some pertinent questions about this worrying issue 
Did we witness ‘a quiet coup’ (S. Johnson) or ‘class warfare’ (W. Buffet)? Has America 
(USA) become a ‘kleptocracy’ (E. Harrison), or a ‘plutocracy’ (P. Krugman, S. Johnson, Y. 
Smith)? Was the financial system an ‘economic pyramid’ (W.K. Black). (2011: 213) 
 
There needs to be a consensus on whether a criminogenic system should be described as predatory or 
piratical. The capitalist system cannot be properly challenged without a critical approach to the grossly 
unfair advantages which operate in an unfettered free-market system 
 
Capitalism can only be ‘axiomatic of decoded streams’ of work and capital as long as they 
circulate in a relatively homogeneous normative territory. In this sense, we are close to the 
theses of Deleuze and Guattari, who see territorial expansion emerging from the 
normalisation of new modes of exchange, the defining feature of a modern capitalist state. 
(Durand and Vergne, 2010: 66)  
 
The difficulties encountered by institutional actors and whistleblowers in the fight against financial 
crime are exacerbated by private institutions and lobbyists acting as if they are above the law and 
drains popular sovereignty of  its trust in state control bodies. The state is seen as colluding, 
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directly or indirectly with predatory, mafia or piratical organisations and it stands to reason that the 
individual motivations of notorious financial criminals such as Madoff could not be realised 
without the complicity or incompetence of regulatory structures. Punishing individual actors in a 
criminal structure is a key deterrent against joining such structures but pointless without a 
crackdown on the rampant among the elite in certain countries, as revealed in Transparency 
International’s annual global corruption index. The individual responsibility of financial crime 
perpetrators should be seen in the much broader context of the shared responsibility of institutions 
leading the fight against these scourges. The golden rule should be that shared responsibility cannot 
be assigned without first dealing with the individual responsibility of perpetrators whose crimes 
were facilitated by collective institutional failings. An individual’s freedom to commit an offence is 
only possible if the state allows it to flourish which implies de facto that resources and sanctions 
must fit the crimes and offences so as to protect the common good rather than satisfy electoral 
ambitions. Habermas explains that mass loyalty stems from accepting the legitimacy of the norm 
and in order for it to be seen as valid, the standard setters must be of impeccable morality 
 
Gaining acceptance on the part of a norm is encoded in a twofold fashion because our 
motives for recognizing normative claims to validity are rooted both in convictions and in 
sanctions, that is, they derive from a complex mixture of rational insight and force. 
Typically, rationally motivated assent will be combined with empirical acquiescence, 
effected by weapons or goods, to form a belief in legitimacy whose component parts are 
difficult to isolate. Such alloys are interesting in that they indicate that a positivistic 
enactment of norms is not sufficient to secure their lasting social acceptance. Enduring 
acceptance of a norm also depends on whether, in a given context of tradition, reasons for 
obedience can be mobilized, reasons that suffice to make the corresponding validity claim 
at least appear justified in the eyes of those concerned. Applied to modern societies, this 
means that there is no mass loyalty without legitimacy. (1981: 61-62)  
 
The choice of norm echoes Durkheim’s notion of normality which explains that crime, a natural 
phenomenon, is a statistical normality and concludes that a society without crime would be 
pathologically affected. (1986) Gayraud, however, believes that society has evolved to the point of 
changing the paradigm of normality by conferring on crime the power to become a norm, 
maintained and protected by elites who have sanctified it in law 
 
Thus, crimes committed by financial elites do not go unpunished because they are above 
the law but because they have been converted, in part, into laws. This partial legalisation of 
serious financial crimes has effectively whitewashed them so that they appear almost 
invisible in the eyes of the court, current morality and the mediasphere. From ‘normality’ to 
the ‘norm’, crime has crossed an historic threshold, giving rise to the following question: by 
taking partial control of the system, does this new, organised white-collar crime actually 
create the system. (2011: 209)  
 
This fundamental question concerns the shared responsibility of citizens in their abandonment of 
the power of contestation and indignation by allowing their national sovereignty, their 
representatives, to delegate to private institutions, the drawing up of European accounting 
standards. This amounts to a regulatory takeover of the legal sphere and the normative 
development process. Individual criminal players cannot be held to account unless the State is 
willing to fully assume its obligations to defend and secure economic and social security. 
According to Lebaron, the impact of neo-classical theories that ultimately aim to dispossess the 
state of its social, economic and sovereign prerogatives stems from ‘a tendency to perceive the 
economic world as the result of adjustments between individual interests, which is particularly 
striking among young men from dominant classes whose lifestyle focuses more readily on being 
perceived as rational and balanced subjects.’ (2000: 118) It is precisely under the paradox of 
defending rationality that economic agents can choose offshore tax havens. While minimising taxes 
will be welcomed as a normal exercise of ‘intellectual fluidity’, any sense of beneficial legal 
constraint for the community will not be perceived as legitimate. Tax fraud will become the logical 
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consequence of a rational choice. The neo-classical model is an inherently deviant choice of 
civilisation where the power of money seeks to annihilate the power of law. (Compin, 2009: 15-39)  
 
Conclusion 
The choice of a civilisation model remains inextricably linked to the moral values which people wish 
to adhere to. Financial crime, the final stage of economic deviance and perversion, merely conveys the 
degeneration of social links exacerbated by a hyper-individualistic system based on a rationale of 
private appropriation of profit 
 
We can resist the cruelty of the world and human cruelty through solidarity, love, reliance 
and by commiserating with those who are its unfortunate victims. The ethical struggle is a 
dual resistance against the cruelty of the world and human cruelty. “Evils can never pass 
away”, said Socrates in The Theaetetus. Yes, but one should try to prevent their triumph.  
(Morin, 2006: 246)  
 
Diagram 1: Legal norms regarding accountability  
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